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Writing as a practitioner of the interpretation of Community law, I have limited this 
article to an illustration, through concrete examples, of how the European Court of 
Justice proceeds on the basis of provisions dealing with equal treatment for men and 
women, and of the types of difficulties encountered in this process.
B efore examining the relevant case law, I would like to make four very brief points in order to clarify the general background. First, a single method ofo o ' o
interpretation is followed by the ECJ whether dealing with 
gender discrimination or with other issues. It is well
o
known that this method is called 'teleological' and 
'systemic', a grand terminology which refers in fact to 
simple notions, which are as follows. When doubts occur 
about the significance of a term or phrase, the selection of 
the proper understanding is performed with regard to the 
object and purpose of the provision itself and of the piece 
of legislation of which it forms part; this is the 
'teleological' side. As for the 'systemic' approach, it means 
that, in addition to the above approach, some guidance is 
sought by studying how the provision relates to other 
notions in the same text, and how it best makes sense in 
the structure and general economy of the document in 
which it is inserted and of Community law as a whole.
Although the ECJ does not always look at the 
preparatory wrork to find out the original intention of the 
legislator, a secondary type of relevant information is 
occasionally found in the context, be it cultural, political, 
diplomatic or other, in which the rule in question was 
adopted. Finally, some useful hints can also be obtained 
through the comparison of the linguistic versions, (which 
are not always one hundred per cent coherent) in which 
the text was negotiated and passed.
My second initial point is that the implementation of 
this method varies to a great extent depending on whether 
the drafting of the provisions under consideration is of a
general, almost philosophical, nature, like the wording of 
the European Convention on Human Pdghts  which forms 
part of Community law   or is very specific and carefully 
articulated in detail, with explicit limitations of the field of 
application, like Community regulations on social security. 
The function of a judge is essentially different when he or 
she is required to act as a secondary legislator and to 
indicate the scope and meaning of rights enunciated in an 
abstract fashion, when his or her task is clearly much more 
limited and should not conflict with the prerogatives of the 
legislative and regulatory powers. It is not always easy for 
the European judge in equal treatment cases, to determine 
which attitude is more suitable in a given situation - foro
example, when there are both general provisions and 
circumscribed regulations applicable to a case, which is 
not uncommon.
My third proviso is a reminder that, with exceptions, 
the ECJ, whose duty it is to decide on the interpretation 
and validity of EC legislation, is not there to interpret 
national law; in particular when a question is addressed to 
the Court by a national judge through a reference for a
J J O O
preliminary ruling. However, to decide whether an 
element of national legislation is compatible with EC law, 
it is necessary to know the actual scope and meaning of 
this element; but this determination is within the 
competence of the national judge alone and the court does 
not verify the accuracy of the presentation of the internal 
legal situation by the author of the referral is accurate. 
Nor, for this reason, does it declare the system of a 
Member State compatible or not with EC law. It simply 19
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states that a particular article or principle of Community 
law does (or does not) preclude a national rule.
The separation of functions between national and 
Community judges does not apply, of course, to direct 
actions in which the court may be asked, by the 
Commission or another Member State, to decide whether 
or not a state has failed to comply with its obligations to 
implement Community law on a specific matter, such as 
gender discrimination. Such actions imply an element of 
direct control, including the interpretation of provisions 
of national law. Yet, there are very few such cases in the 
relevent area; and almost all cases I have been through 
when preparing this contribution were references under 
Art. 177/234 of the EC treaty.
My last point of introduction is that discrimination 
cases are rather numerous in the case law of the court and 
take more and more of its time; more at any rate than the 
inexperienced observer might think, considering that such 
issues are more directly related to the cultural evolution of 
modern societies than to the economic integration of 
Member States, for which the Community was originally 
given competence. This shows, first, how Community law 
pervades our daily life and, second, how fundamental the 
principle of equal treatment has become in the culture of 
labour law.
In addition to that, the geographical distribution of 
references for preliminary rulings in this area is relatively 
unbalanced since the United Kingdom and Germany are 
the origins, in similar numbers, of about 80 per cent of the 
selection of references I have been through, with the few 
others emanating from French or Austrian courts. It
o
would be ludicrous to assume that more discrimination 
problems exist in these countries than among their 
partners. The imbalance can probably be more safely 
attributed to the degree of awareness of the legal 
professions and to the activism they demonstrate 
regarding these issues.
o o
The three main areas in which problems of 
interpretation currently arise for the court are (1) equal 
treatment regarding access to employment and working 
conditions, (2) equal pay and (3) non-discrimination 
according to sexual orientation.
EQUAL TREATMENT
The principle of equal treatment is defined by the Equal 
Treatment Directive 1976 as meaning that
'there shall he no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex, 
either directly or indirectly, by reference in particular to marital or 
jdmily status ...as regards access to employment, including 
promotion, and to vocational training and as regards working 
conditions'.
However, the Directive does not apply to activities 'for 
which, by reason of their nature or the context in which 
they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a
determining factor'(Art. 2(2)) and allows 'provisions 
concerning the protection of women, particularly as 
regards pregnancy and maternity 1 (Art. 2(3)). It is also 
without prejudice to measures enacted to promote equal 
opportunities (Art. 2(4)).
Since the entry into force of the Treaty oj Amsterdam, 
the prohibition of discrimination based on sex has been 
inserted in Art. 13 of the EC treaty as a fundamental right. 
But it is on the basis of the Directive that the case-law has 
been established. The principle has been invoked in cases 
of refusal to employ women, in particular in the army and 
in the police. I would like to say a word, in this 
connection, of the Jo hn s ton, Sirdar and Kreil cases.
In the case of Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable oj 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 15 May 1986 (222/84) 
[1986] ECR 1651, Johnston was a member of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary full time reserve who, following the 
decision of the Chief Constable that men, due to the 
situation in Northern Ireland, would carry firearms in the 
course of their duties but that women would not be so 
equipped, was not offered a renewal of her contract with 
the RUC. The Industrial Tribunal of Northern Ireland 
referred to the court, among other points, the issue of the 
interpretation of the exceptions contained in the 1976 
Directive in a context characterised by threats to national 
security and public safety.
Advocate General Darmon expressed the opinion that 
the exclusion of women from employment as armed 
members of a police reserve could, in exceptional 
circumstances relating to public order, fall within the 
scope of the derogation provided for in the Directive and 
that it was for the national judge to determine whether, in 
the present case, the derogation was acceptable. The court 
ruled that there had to be judicial control over this type of 
derogation, which could find its basis only in the 
provisions of Art. 2 of the 1976 Directive, even if the 
protection of public safety was at stake. The judgment 
accepts that, although it must be interpreted strictly, the 
exception concerning activities 'for which the sex of the 
worker constitutes a determining factor' allows a Member 
State to restrict, on the basis of Art. 2(2), general policing 
duties to men equipped with firearms, in an internal 
situation characterized by frequent assassinations. It 
makes clear, however, that the derogation concerning the 
protection of women (Art. 2(3) does not apply since it 
covers only situations in which risks and dangers exist that 
affect women as such.
The same 'tolerant' or 'understanding' approach was 
also followed by the court in the case of Angela Sirdar v 
Secretary of State for Defence, 26 October 1999 (C- 
273/97) [1999] 3 CMLR 559. Sirdar had served as a chef 
in the British Army when she was made redundant for 
economic reasons. She was initially offered a transfer to 
the Royal Marines, also as a chef, but was eventually 
informed that she was ineligible, since the Royal Marines
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employed only men by reason of the rule of 
'interoperability' established for the purpose of ensuring 
combat effectiveness. The reference by the Industrial 
Tribunal at Bury St Edmunds, was, again, focused on the 
notion of 'determining factor' in Art. 2(2) of theO ^ '
Directive. The court's decision stresses that the review of 
the use made of the derogation by the authorities of a 
Member State must be based on proportionality. The 
ruling, considering that the Royal Marines are a small 
force representing the first line of attack of the British 
armed forces, accepts that chefs are also required to act as 
front-line commandos and that the composition of this 
force can be exclusively male; and that this exclusion is 
appropriate and necessary to achieve the aim of 
guaranteeing public security. This aim grants the Member 
State a certain degree of discretion to assess the need to 
maintain the exclusion in the light of social developments.
After this ruling, it was not without some 
disappointment that the German armed forces received 
the judgment of the court in the case of Tanja Kreil v 
Germany, 11 January 2000 (C-285/98) The Times, 29 
November 2000. But the German Soldatengesetz, 
referred to the court by the Verwaltungsgericht Hanover, 
was vastly different from the provisions considered in the 
previous cases, in so far as it excluded any woman from 
armed service in the whole Bundeswehr and allowed them 
to be engaged only in the medical and military-music 
services. The court did not accept that the mention of 
public security was sufficient to give a Member State 
discretion to exclude women from almost all military 
posts in armed units. The court rejected the justification 
offered regarding the fact that members of the forces may 
be called on to use arms and regarded the nationalo
measure as contravening the principle of proportionality.
Discrimination in access to training is also banned by 
the Directive. This matter has been addressed by the 
Court in the case of Schnorbus v Land Hessen, 7 
December 2000 (C-79/99) [2001] 1 CMLR 40.
Julia Schnorbus, after completing her legal studies, 
applied for admission to the practical training necessary to 
obtain a post in the judicial service or the higher civil 
service in Land Hessen (Germany). She was not 
immediately accepted for this training, on the basis of 
provisions allowing the admission to be deferred by up to 
12 months except for applicants who have completed 
military or substitute service (which is obligatory only for 
men) who have to be admitted immediately.
On the questions asked by the Verwaltungsgericht 
Frankfurt, the court had no difficulty in recognising that 
the law of Land Hessen was favourable to men having 
accomplished military or civilian service and thus 
constituted indirect discrimination based on sex. It went 
on to examine whether this discrimination was justified 
under the derogation contained in Art. 2(4) of the 
Directive concerning measures intended to promote equal
opportunities. The examination revealed no intention 
behind the provision except that of counterbalancing to 
some extent the career delay resulting from the 
completion of compulsory service by men. The difference 
of treatment among applicants for legal training, never 
exceeding 12 months, was therefore regarded as& ' o
proportionate and compatible with equal treatment.
The Directive also guarantees, in Art. 5, equal 
treatment in the conditions governing dismissal.o o
In Barbel Kachelmann v Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG, 
26 September 2000 (C-322/98) [2001] IRLR 49, 
Kachelmann, who was employed by a German bank on a 
part-time basis for 30 hours a week, was dismissed on 
economic grounds. In order to select the worker to be 
dismissed on social criteria, as German law required, the 
bank only considered part-time employees. Mrs 
Kachelmann claimed, before die Landesarbeitsgericht 
Hamburg, that this constituted discrimination as womeno7
were substantially more numerous than men in the 
category of part-time workers. Besides, she mentioned 
that another female worker, who was working full-time,7 o '
should have been dismissed instead of her, as she had 
priority over her on the basis of social criteria.
The court was asked to decide whether the Directive 
precluded social legislation under which, to selectF o '
employees for dismissal, part-time female employees were 
not regarded as comparable to male and female full-time 
employees. The court accepted that there was a difference 
of treatment between full-time and part-time workers but 
that social policy was presently a matter for the Member 
States and that social protection measures were within the 
margin of discretion of governments, as long as they met 
a legitimate aim and were justified by factors unrelated to 
sex. The court noted that such justification existed, simply 
adding that it was a matter for the national legislature to 
find a fair balance in employment law between the various 
interests concerned.
Measures intended to promote equality by giving 
priority to women have given rise to such famous 
decisions as Kalanke, Marschall and Badeck.
In Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 17 
October 1995 (C-450/93) [1995] ECR 1-3051, Kalanke 
was a candidate for a post of section manager in the Parks 
Department of the City of Bremen (Germany). He was 
not given the job because the other shortlisted candidate, 
who was considered equally qualified to him, was a 
woman and was therefore given the preference by 
application of the Landesgleichstellungsgesetz (Bremen 
Law on equal treatment).
Following a reference by the Bundesarbeitsgericht, the 
court noted that a national rule under which women are 
automatically given priority in sectors where they are 
under-represented, when equally qualified as male 
candidates for the same promotion, involved
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discrimination on grounds of sex. To decide whether this 
rule was permissible under Art. 2(4) of the Directive, 
concerning 'measures to promote equal opportunity for 
men and women, in particular by removing existing 
inequalities which affect women's opportunities', the 
court explained that the measures concerned by the 
derogation were those intended to eliminate or reduce 
actual instances of inequality existing in social life by giving 
a specific advantage to women competing in the labour 
market. But this derogation should be interpreted strictly 
and should not go beyond what is required to improve 
women's opportunities. Stating that women will 
automatically get the job if they do not make up at least 
half of the staff in the relevant personnel group, and if they 
have the same qualification as their male competitors, is a 
rule that is too absolute and too unconditional to fit 
within the limits of the exception. Instead of improving 
the conditions of competition, it suppresses competition 
altogether. It is therefore precluded by the Directive.
The case of Helmut Marschall v Nordheim-Westfallen, 11 
November 1997 (C-409/9S) [1998] IRLR 39, gave the 
court an opportunity to set the limits of this area of case 
law by indicating the conditions under which affirmative 
action was acceptable in the field of job competition. He 
was a teacher for the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Germany) and, again, was refused a promotion which was 
given to an equally qualified female colleague. The 
legislation concerned was not as blunt as that in Kalanke 
since it gave priority for promotion to women (when 
under-represented) 'in the event of equal suitability, 
competence and professional performance, unless reasons 
specific to an individual male candidate tilt the balance in 
his favour'.
The court found merit in the final proviso of this clause 
and ruled that a provision such as that under consideration 
was compatible with the 1976 Directive, on condition that 
the candidature of an equally qualified male must be 
subject to an objective assessment, taking into account all 
criteria and not excluding the possibility that the priority 
for women might be overruled in his favour. In other 
words, there could be no a priori preference, but must be a 
case-by-case consideration of the merits is in order.
In Re Georg Badeck's Application, 28 March 2000 (C- 
158/97) [2000] IRLR 432 and others are members of the 
Landtag of Hesse (Germany) who questioned the 
constitutionality of statutory provisions regarding 
women's advancement plans and their conformity with 
the 1976 Directive. The Staatsgerichtshof des Landes
o
Hessen referred to the court five separate issues which I 
cannot explain in detail here, but which cover the limits of 
priority, the targets of the plan, the allocation of training 
places, the organisation of interviews, and the1 7 o '
composition of representative bodies. Suffice it to say that 
the court expanded on the reasoning at work in the 
Marschall case.
EQUAL PAY
Lqual pay is an area covered by different Community 
law provisions. Article. 141 (ex 119) of the EC treaty 
states that 'each Member State shall ensure that the 
principle of equal pay for male and female workers for 
equal work or work of equal value is applied' and further 
defines what is meant by 'pay'. Para. 4 of the article 
safeguards the possibility to prevent or to compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers through specific 
measures in favour of the under-represented sex.
The Equal Pay Directive 1975 complements these 
provisions of primary law. Out of a substantial body of case 
law, I will limit myself to three recent examples of 
interpretation by the court of the relevant notions.
The Austrian case of the Angestelltenbetriebsrat der 
Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse, 11 May 1999 (C-309/97) 
[1999] ECR 1-2865 deals with the meaning of the words 
'the same work' contained in Art. 141 EC and in Art. 1 of 
the 1975 Directive. The dispute which the 
Oberlandesgericht Wien had to settle was between ao
Health Fund and one category of persons employed by the 
Fund as psychotherapists. Graduate psychologists, 
employed as psychotherapists, were complaining that they 
were not placed in the same salary group as doctors, 
employed   according to them   to do 'the same work'. It 
so happened that more women than men were present in 
the category of psychologists than in that of doctors.
Discrimination being defined as the application of 
different rules to comparable situations or the application 
of the same rule to different situations (Gillespie v 
Department of Health and Social Services, 13 February 1996 
(C-342/93) [1996] ECR 1-475) the difficulty often met is 
in the description of the groups of reference. In the 
present instance, the difference lay in the fact that the 
members of each group had received different training. 
The court acknowledged that professional training and
O I O
qualification could be a relevant criterion for determining 
whether the same work was performed. Although the 
activities of all psychotherapists were 'seemingly identical' 
and charged according to a single tariff, the difference 
between the knowledge, skills and expertise for which they 
have been recruited, either as doctors or as psychologists, 
made it impossible to regard their situation as comparable 
or the work they performed as the same: and this made 
the difference of salary compatible with the relevant EC 
provisions.
In the case of Shirley Preston and others v 
Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust (No.l), 16 May 
2000 (C-78/98) [2000] IRLR 506, who were part-time 
workers in die United Kingdom in the public and private 
sectors who, following previous rulings by the court, in
' O 1 O J '
the Vroege and Fisscher cases, claimed that their exclusion 
from occupational pension schemes on the ground that 
they worked part-time had been unlawful and 
discriminatory because (as was not disputed) it concerned
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a much greater number of women than men. They also 
claimed that they ought to be retroactively entitled to 
membership of the relevant pensions schemes for the 
periods of part-time employment they had completed 
before the national legislation was adjusted to fit the 
requirements put forward by the court.
The ruling in this case, answering a complex series of 
questions raised by the House of Lords, embodies the 
principle of effectiveness and equivalence that must prevail 
in the guarantee of rights derived by individuals from 
Community law, in particular compared with rights of 
national origin. It replies, in particular, that EC law does 
not preclude a time-limit of six months after the end of 
employment for claiming membership of a pension 
scheme, given that domestic law does not contain more 
favourable provisions for similar actions; and that the six 
months period is calculated, in the case of successive 
short-term contracts, not from the end of each contract 
but from the end of the whole period of employment. 
This example shows how far the judge must sometimes go 
in the review of the consequences of his theoretical 
pronouncements.
Joseph Griesmar brought to the French Conseil 
d'Etat, which addressed a reference to the court, an 
apparently more straightforward issue which is still 
pending in Luxembourg - which prevents me from 
saying anything about the case except about the 
terms of the debate as they are mentioned in the 
opinion of Advocate General Alber of 22 February 
2001 (Griesmar case, C-366/99). To put it briefly, 
the plaintiff, a member of the French judiciary who 
has retired, claims that his retirement pension is 
calculated in a manner contrary to the principle of 
equal pay between men and women, since the 
national statute concerning the pensions of civil 
servants grants women who have had children an
o
additional pension benefit corresponding to a year 
of employment for each child they have borne. As 
the father of three children, Mr Griesmar regards 
the fact that he did not receive the same benefit as 
a discrimination falling under Art. 141 EC. M Alber 
concludes for his part that the provisions of 
national law do not go against the principle of equal 
pay. We may expect a very vivid discussion of this 
problem by the court.
I may only mention in passing the judgment in the 
Abdoulaye v Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA, 16 
September 1999 (C-218/98) [1999] IRLR 811 case as it 
illustrates a central concept in the court's approach to 
salary benefits reserved to women. The court ruled that 
Art. 141 (ex 119) 'does not preclude the making of a 
lump-sum payment exclusively to female workers who 
take maternity leave where that payment is designed to 
offset the occupational disadvantages which arise for those 
workers as a result of their being away from work'.
DISCRIMINATION ACCORDING TO 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Let me pass now to the few, but very well-known, cases 
dealing with alleged discrimination, not on grounds of the 
gender of the person concerned, but on grounds of his or 
her sexual preferences or orientations. I realise that it is 
debatable whether this is the best way to present the issue, 
since one of the legal points under discussion is whether 
differences of treatment based on the sex of the partner, 
and more specifically on whether or not the partner is of 
the same sex as the person concerned, are discriminations 
based on sex or another form of discrimination.
This puts in question the respective role of the judge 
and die legislator in areas that involve choices of social 
evolution. It is symptomatic in this respect that, where the 
European Court of Human Rights never hesitated to give 
very broad definitions of the terms of its instrument of 
reference, the Court of Justice has always been more 
careful in its desire not to interfere with social decisions 
that, in its view, should result from the people's will rather 
than from an arbitrary expansion of the field of 
application of principles. But this puts the Luxembourg 
Court in an uncomfortable position, because it should 
implement the ECHR as forming part of EU law under 
Art. 6 of the Treaty on European Union, and it is 
inconceivable that the interpretation of the Convention 
should be conducted without reference to the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court.
The case of P v S and Cornwall County Council, 30 April 
1996 (C-13/94) [1996] ECR 1-2143, is often 
misinterpreted. P was a manager in an educational 
establishment in Cornwall who, although physically of the 
male sex, first started dressing and behaving as a woman 
before taking the physical attributes of a woman after 
undergoing surgical operations. He was given notice and 
dismissed. The Industrial Tribunal at Truro referred to the 
court the question whether the dismissal of a transsexual 
by a reason related to gender reassignment was a breach of 
the 1976 Directive on equal treatment.
The court ruled that it was; but, contrary to what over- 
enthusiastic commentators held, this ruling had nothing
' o to
or little to do with sexual orientation, being instead a 
direct case of gender-based discrimination. As the motives 
indicated in point 2 1, 'where a person is dismissed on the 
ground that he or she intends to undergo, or has 
undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is treated 
unfavourably by comparison with persons of the sex to 
which he or she was deemed to belong before undergoingo to to
gender reassignment', a difference of treatment between 
the two genders, be they contained in one singleo ' J to
individual, is a direct discrimination : As a male person, E 
had the job; after his gender change, he lost it.) ' o to '
The lawyers who inferred from P v S that the so-called 
'generous' outlook taken by the court regarding
o J to o
transsexuals would certainly be extended to homosexuals
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were wrong, because the two issues are entirely separate in 
legal terms.
In the case of Lisa Grant v South-West Trains Ltd, 17 
February 1998 (C-249/96) [1998] ECR 1-621, Grant 
was a female employee of South West Trains Ltd who was 
refused travel concessions for her female partner, where 
privilege tickets would have been granted had her partner 
been of the opposite sex. She regarded this state of 
affairs as discrimination based on sex, violating inter alia 
Art. 119 of the EC treaty and the 1975 and 1976 
Directives. The Industrial Tribunal at Southampton 
referred the question of interpretation of these 
provisions to the ECJ.
The court, basing itself on Community law as it stood 
before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, did not 
characterise the treatment to which the plaintiff was 
submitted as amounting to a gender-based
o o
discrimination. It first noted that the refusal of travel 
concessions to the same-sex partner was not directly 
based on the sex of the employee (contrast the P v S case) 
or even on the sex of the partner, but rather on the 
character of their relationship: homosexual and not 
heterosexual. The court went on to check whether an 
assimilation in rights of homosexual relationships to 
heterosexual ones was an integral part of the state of law 
in the Community at the relevant time. Taking into 
account not only Community instruments, but 
international law, European Human Rights law and the 
law of Member States, the court concluded that it was not 
in a position to recognise the existence, de lege lata, of 
such an overall assimilation. However it noted that the 
issue was in the hands of the legislature, to whom the 
Amsterdam Treaty gives a legal basis to take appropriate 
action to eliminate discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.
I can hardly conclude my picture of the jurisprudence 
widiout mentioning a case in which the ruling will be 
issued on 3 1 May and, therefore, cannot be commented 
on yet. The opinion by Advocate General Mischo of 22 
February 2001 (C-122/99P and C-125/99P) D and Sweden 
v Council cases pose the problem of members of the 
Community personnel who claim the benefit of the family 
allowance which the statute provides for married agents, 
whereas they have entered into a legally registered 
homosexual partnership to which the Swedish national 
law attributes similar effects to that of marriage. The
o
situation is even more complex in the case of the 
Netherlands who have now made it possible for people of 
the same sex to be literally 'married'.
The court is faced with a problem of interpretation of 
the terms of 'marriage' and 'married' contained in a
o
Council regulation but dealing with a subject matter   
that of the legal status of persons   which has not been 
transferred to the Community by the Member States. The 
Council could legally have decided to extend the benefit
of the allowance to homosexual partners legally 
recognised in a Member State; but, this not being the 
case, the option of the court is either to regard the terms 
as making implicit reference to the law of the country of 
origin of the staff member (which implies that they will 
have different interpretations) or to rule that terms 
contained in the staff statute must have a single meaning 
- which means that the court will have to provide a 
Community interpretation of what is a marriage and of 
whether it may be open to people of the same sex. A 
difficult determination , if ever there was one, for a judge 
trying not to interfere excessively with the prerogatives of 
the legistator!
o
I intend to draw no conclusion from this pragmaticr o
description of the main discrimination issues currently 
concerning the court   save perhaps to draw your 
attention to a technical point that I have left in the 
background but which might deserve a better place in 
another paper. I have in mind the question of the 
drafting of references by national courts for preliminary 
rulings on the interpretation and validity of EC anti- 
discrimination law. It is clear that, if we compare the 
various cases I have just listed, there is an enormous 
difference between the very specific language used by, 
say, UK courts (like the reference by the House of Lords 
in the Preston case) and die succinct formulation used, 
say, by the Conseil d'Etat in the Griesmar reference. Both 
methods are precise, but one leads the court to start 
from the characteristic elements of a given situation to 
see how it can best be addressed in a concrete fashion, 
while the other encourages it to expand on the 
theoretical character of a legal concept before applying it 
to a case.
Of course, the court has the freedom to reformulate 
the questions posed, and differences of style in referrals 
are not binding on the Community judge. However this 
judge will hesitate to depart too openly from the 
wording used by a supreme court of a Member State. 
The degree of influence thus exercised by referring 
judges on the way Community law is interpreted by the 
ECJ, regarding in particular the doctrine of precedent, 
should not be under-estimated. This is particularly true 
in areas like equal treatment where both general 
principles and detailed specifications are part of the 
picture.©
Judge Jean-Pierre Puissochet
Counsellor of State, Judije of the European Court of Justice
This article is taken from a paper given at a Statute Law Society 
Conference held at Jean Moulin University, Lyon, on 12 and 13 May, 
2000, on the theme of 'Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Europe: 
Issues of Drafting and Interpretation'.
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